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''Vance v. Terrazas'', 444 U.S. 252 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court decision that established that a United States citizen cannot have his or her citizenship taken away unless he or she has acted with an intent to give up that citizenship. The Supreme Court overturned portions of an act of Congress which had listed various actions and had said that the performance of any of these actions could be taken as conclusive, irrebuttable proof of intent to give up U.S. citizenship. However, the Court ruled that a person's intent to give up citizenship could be established through a standard of preponderance of evidence (i.e., more likely than not) — rejecting an argument that intent to relinquish citizenship could only be found on the basis of clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. == Background == Laurence Terrazas was born in the United States in 1947.〔 Note the different order of the names in this lower court case.〕 Because Terrazas's father was Mexican and because Mexico's then-effective citizenship laws followed the principle of ''ius sanguinis'', Terrazas held Mexican citizenship at birth, and because he was born in the United States, Terrazas also held U.S. citizenship under the ''ius soli'' of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, Terrazas was a dual citizen of the United States and Mexico at birth.〔 While enrolled at a Mexican university in 1970, Terrazas applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality. As part of his application, Terrazas signed a statement renouncing "United States citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United States of America." During subsequent discussions with a U.S. consular official, Terrazas gave conflicting answers as to whether or not he had truly intended to abandon his rights as a U.S. citizen when he applied for his certificate of Mexican nationality. The State Department eventually concluded that he had lost his U.S. citizenship—a decision which Terrazas appealed, first before the State Department's board of appellate review, and subsequently to the courts. Before the 1967 Supreme Court ruling in ''Afroyim v. Rusk,'' U.S. law had provided for numerous ways for U.S. citizens to lose their citizenship. In its ''Afroyim'' ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred Congress from revoking anyone's U.S. citizenship without their consent. Specifically, the court held that a law automatically revoking the U.S. citizenship of anyone who had voted in a foreign election was unconstitutional and unenforceable. However, U.S. law continued after ''Afroyim'' to list several other "expatriating acts," the voluntary performance of any of which would result in automatic loss of citizenship.〔Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 349; 8 U.S.C. (sec. 1481 ). The phrase ''"voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality"'' was added in 1986, and various other changes have been made over time to the list of expatriating acts; see (notes ).〕 The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that according to ''Afroyim v. Rusk,'' "Congress is constitutionally devoid of the power" to revoke citizenship; and further, that Congress had no power to legislate any evidentiary standard for proving Terrazas's intent to relinquish his citizenship that fell short of a requirement of proof by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. The Secretary of State appealed〔Stern, Gressman, and Shapiro, "(Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction )." ''ABA Journal,'' December 1988, p. 66. "In 1937, during a time of constitutional challenges to many federal statutes, Congress also provided for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of any federal court—trial or appellate—holding a federal statute unconstitutional.... On June 27 (), President Reagan signed legislation that freed the Court from virtually all appeals...."〕 this ruling to the Supreme Court, questioning not only the appellate court's finding on the required standard of proof, but also challenging the finding that a separate intent to give up citizenship was required (as opposed merely to the performance of a designated expatriating act). 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Vance v. Terrazas」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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